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I. Introduction 
Switzerland will vote on several popular initiatives requesting "good" laws, both on the 
federal and on the state level. One political party is gathering signatures for an initiative 
proposing a new constitutional right "to laws that are understandable and simply, unbu-
reaucratically and efficiently implemented." Some cantons have adopted laws to improve 
the quality of legislation and to diminish the administrative burden of small and medium 
enterprises.  
The paper will study these popular initiatives in the light of modern legislation theory. It 
will assess their chances and risks to improve the quality of legislation. In order to do so 
the paper first must turn to possible understandings of better legislation or better regula-
tion. 
 
II. Struggle for Quality in Legislation 
1. Different Ideals 
There is little doubt that the quality of legislation is of high political and legal importance. 
There is a widespread consensus that laws must be "good"1. The consensus often goes 
further that the quality of current legislation is poor – whoever enters the field of legisla-
tion enters an area of permanent crisis, so to speak2. There is little debate, however, 
what are actually the criteria to determine the quality of legislation.  
The quality of legislation can be understood at least in three different respects: 
First, laws can be considered "good" if they fulfill criteria of sound legal drafting3. Such 
criteria are sometimes quite technical, e.g. the proper numeration of a law, but easily 
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also affect the content of the law, such as the request for coherent wording of the text. 
Some of these rules are quite vague, such as the "clarity" of law4. 
Second, laws can be assessed on the basis of their chance to succeed, their effectiveness 
to achieve a certain aim. Such a perspective is typically taken by the OECD and other 
international bodies5. In its seven "Guiding Principles for Regulatory Quality", principle 
one requires the adoption of clearly identified political goals, whereas principle two 
stresses the importance to "assess impacts and review regulation systematically to en-
sure that they meet the intended objectives efficiently […]"6. In this respect, the term 
often used is "regulation" which encompasses the – important – aspects of implementa-
tion and enforcement. 
Third, one should not forget that a good law should also be fair or just, in order to use a 
broad term for the material quality of the law. Obviously, the fairness of legislation is 
difficult to measure on a scientific level; there is an ongoing debate whether legislation 
theory can and should say something on the fairness of legislation7. To be on the safe 
side, one may require at least the "rationality" of the law8 which brings a good law near 
the requirements of the effective implementation of clear objectives, as described before. 
A rational decision requires a "solid evidence base"9. However, solid evidence "is an aid 
to political decision-making, not a substitute for it"10. Additionally, a "fair" or "just" law 
may be also one that has been enacted in a highly democratic process, being the product 
of a fair, open debate in public and – ideally – being accepted by the vast majority of 
citizens11. In this sense, the function of the law is not only effective regulation "from 
above" but being a valuable tool of social peace keeping12. 
The three aspects of good legislation obviously overlap in some aspects. A contradictory 
law is hardly a product of good legislative technique, will typically be hard to implement 
and – being contradictory – will often violate standards of fairness such as the principle 
of equality. In such cases, the elements of good legislation are concurrent. This may not 
hold true for others. A poorly drafted statute may not harm implementation when nobody 
reads the law but everyone agrees on the rule to be. Good drafting and an elaborate de-
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mocratic process may enhance quality and acceptance of the law but may impede the 
effectiveness of the regulation if they come with a long process for elaboration; effective 
regulation often requires swift action. 
2. Different Methods und Different Authorities 
The different understandings of "good" legislation explain why also the methods of meas-
uring and improving the quality of legislation must be different. Drafting a good legal text 
is typically a lawyers' task. Measuring the impacts of the law will be done by a specialized 
team, familiar with the techniques of evaluation13. The "fairness" of legislation must be 
decided upon by a political institution in a democratic deliberation.  
Hence, the different aspects of "good" legislation must be assured by different authorities 
– not every authority is comparably apt to ensure certain aspects of good legislation. It is 
common knowledge that members of Parliaments – rightly – care more about the "politi-
cal" aspects of legislation than the adherence to drafting guidelines14. It is less clear 
whether administrative units preparing legislation should think "politically" or "strategi-
cally"15. Of course, this does not exclude that certain authorities or certain instruments 
will help to ensure different aspects of good legislation. Consultation procedure, e.g., "is 
intended to provide information on material accuracy, feasibility of implementation and 
public acceptance of a federal project"16.  
In my view, concepts for better regulation only work properly if (1) they make sufficiently 
clear what aspect of regulation has to be improved, (2) are attributed to the proper au-
thority and (3) fit in logically in the legislative process in force. Even then, programs for 
better regulation will fail if they are not endorsed by the authority in charge or if they are 
poorly funded17.  
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III. Better Regulation in Switzerland 
1. Current Situation 
For a long time, the legislative process in Switzerland was a quiet field, politically speak-
ing. Preparation of laws is a typical a task of the executive branch18. According to arti-
cle 181 of the Swiss Constitution, "the Federal Council shall submit drafts of Federal As-
sembly legislation to the Federal Assembly." The task of preparation is usually handed 
down to the administration. On the federal level, the Federal Office of Justice (FOJ) has 
specialized legislative units in order to support the special branches. It also ensures the 
knowledge and the education of the civil servants19. The cantons (states) often have 
similar units. 
In the last ten years, Swiss Parliaments tends to become more active in drafting legisla-
tion themselves. This tendency may be explained not only by increasing regulatory pres-
sure20 but also that the usually weakly staffed legislator now often has more ample re-
sources, not matching these of the administration but at least allowing proper legislative 
work. Still, the work on laws in Parliament typically focuses on political questions21. 
The administration itself has been active to introduce new tools into the legislative proc-
ess. On the federal level and in several cantons (states) the government launched initia-
tives to improve the overall quality of existing legislation22. Regulatory Impact Analysis 
(RIA) has been embraced by the Swiss Government in 199923, transferring this task to 
State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (seco). The newly drafted Swiss Constitution of 
1999 explicitly requires in article 170 that "federal measures are evaluated with regard to 
their effectiveness"24. However – as criticized by the OECD – the RIA is late in the politi-
cal process if ever applied, the seco is meagerly staffed to deal with this task and in-
depth cost-benefit analysis are rarely carried out25. Additionally, the seco typically fo-
cuses on economic aspects of regulation. The Federal Office of Justice (FOJ), overseeing 
legislation in general, also deals with RIA, usually using the term "evaluation". In 2004, a 
working group between several administrative units, including the seco und the FOJ, pre-
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pared a common report on the techniques to measure the effectiveness of federal meas-
ures26. 
The seco also has introduced "simplified" RIA in order to assess the needs of small and 
medium enterprises (SME)27. These tests are typically carried out by a series of in-depth 
interviews with selected firms28. The advantages of this technique are savings of time 
and costs. 
2. Popular Initiatives 
In recent years, more political consideration was given to the regulative process. The first 
popular initiatives typically were closely linked to the needs of small and medium enter-
prises (SME), specifically objecting the rise of administrative burdens. These popular ini-
tiatives were launched in many Swiss cantons29, coordinated by the local trade associa-
tion and political allies. In the canton of Zurich, a popular initiative introduced a "Law to 
Reduce the Density of Legislation and the Administrative Burden on Small und and Me-
dium Enterprises (SME)"30. According to the formulated legal text of the initiative, the 
number of legal norms (§ 1 sec. 2 lit. b) and the effort to find and consult them (§ 1 
sec. 2 lit. g) have to be reduced. Administrative procedures must be simplified (§ 1 
sec. 2 lit. d) and coordinated (§ 1 sec. 2 lit. e and § 4). Regulatory impact assessment 
has to be established (§ 3), applying to new as well as to existing legislation (§ 3 sec. 3 
and § 5). 
The government of Zurich as well as Parliament rejected the initiative but introduced a 
counter-project which induced the committee to withdraw its initiative. The counter-
project was much shorter than the initiative. As the title indicates, the new law focuses 
on the administrative burden on enterprises31. Zurich is supposed to reduce the number 
of administrative units to be consulted, give access to the administration by electronic 
means, simplify and harmonize forms and data collection by the administration (§ 1 
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sec. 2). RIA – in respect to the administrative burden of enterprises – has been intro-
duced, limited however to new projects and newly enacted laws (§ 3); older laws must 
checked on their compliance with the reduction of administrative burden, as § 5 puts it 
more vaguely. The new law has entered into force on January 1, 2011.  
On the federal level, one political party is currently gathering votes for a popular initiative 
named "Stop Bureaucracy!"32. In article 94 of the Swiss Constitution (principles of the 
economic system) a new sentence shall be introduced. Currently, federal and state au-
thorities "shall endeavor to create favorable general conditions for the private sector in 
accordance with their responsibilities" (article 94 sec. 3). The initiative adds: "They take 
measures to reduce the density of legislation and the administrative burden for the pri-
vate sectors, with special regard to small and medium enterprises." 
It is noteworthy that the popular initiative tries to write an individual right to "unbureauc-
ratic" enforcement into the constitution. The proposed new article 9a of the Constitution 
reads as follows: 
"Every person has a right to laws […] that are understandable and simply, unbureaucratically 
and efficiently implemented […]." 
The initiative was published in the Swiss Official Journal (Bundesblatt) on October 12, 
201033, which triggers the 18-month period within the gathering of the necessary 
100'000 signatures has to take place (until April 12, 2012). A successful popular initiative 
must be submitted to the vote of the people and the cantons (states), with Parliament 
either rejecting or supporting the initiative (article 139 sec. 5 Swiss constitution). 
3. Better Regulation through Popular Initiatives? 
One may only speculate on the effects of these initiatives on the legislative process. Will 
they lead to better regulation? 
In my opinion, the initiatives correctly stress the importance of proper enforcement. Even 
the best legislation will be ineffective or even harmful if implementation and enforcement 
fail. The canton of Zurich concentrates its efforts on the administrative burden of enter-
prises which seems to be a realistic concept, especially at the state level. The reduction 
of administrative burden as a key point is certainly a rather vague idea, however easier 
measurable and attainable than many concepts of better regulation. The new law also 
clearly allocates competences and duties between legislator, executive branch and ad-
ministration. Practice will prove whether the authorities meet the expectations. 
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The popular initiatives may also stimulate the RIA efforts on the federal level. Indeed, 
many of the ideas behind these initiatives are fully in line with (and actually support) the 
efforts to evaluate and to improve the effectiveness of federal measures34. The popular 
initiatives are clearly business oriented which is basically also the focus of the State Se-
cretariat for Economic Affairs (seco)35. 
However, the popular initiatives will probably fall short of improving the quality of legisla-
tion. The request for a lower density of legislation is misleading if not harmful to the very 
interests of the political forces behind these initiatives. A lower density of legislation may 
lead to less regulation if the term is understood as a test to the very necessity of a legal 
norm36. More commonly, density of legislation describes the leeway of an authority to 
apply a specific norm; a dense norm gives only a small margin of appreciation whereas 
open norms open large margins37. The same holds true for less regulation: Less regula-
tion usually leads to gaps to be filled by the enforcing authority. Such margins of appre-
ciation for the administrative authorities – meaning power to enforce the policy chosen 
by the administrative authority – is hardly what the drafters of the popular initiatives had 
in mind. 
The popular initiatives will also be little effective where they simply state very general 
principles of good legislation. "Understandable" laws is certainly a well meant idea which 
follows a certain Swiss tradition of good law drafting38. However, "understandable" laws 
may endanger the preciseness of the law; a law understandable to laymen may confuse 
experts. Additionally, if everyone is responsible for the implementation of general princi-
ples such as the "understandability", experience suggests that no one will care. True, 
legislator may give specific meaning to abstract constitutional principles – however, legis-
lator can do so even in the absence of such principles. There is little need for new consti-
tutional norms. 
Possibly aware of such shortcomings, the popular initiative states a "right" to "laws that 
are understandable and simply, unbureaucratically and efficiently implemented." The 
proposed article 9a of the Swiss constitution is located in the chapter on fundamental 
rights, just after the protection against arbitrary conduct and the principle of good faith 
(article 9) and the right to life and to personal freedom (article 10). The drafters of the 
                                          
34  Cf. III. 1. 
35  Cf. III. 1. 
36  Müller (2006: 159), Weber-Dürler (2005: 594), decision of the federal court BGE 136 I 29 (principle of pro-
portionality in legislation).  
37  Häfelin/Müller/Uhlmann (2010: 98-99), Tschannen/Zimmerli/Müller (2009: 208-12). 
38  It was Eugen Huber, drafter of the Swiss civil code, who came up with the famous words that a good legisla-
tor should think like a philosopher but write like a farmer, cf. Lötscher/Nussbaumer (2007: 5). 
popular initiative clearly intended to introduce a fundamental right that can be relied 
upon before any state authority, including courts. The open question remains whether 
article 9a really adds something new to the Constitution. Already today, a law that can-
not be understood is not applicable to private parties – although, admittedly, courts often 
accept legislation that is badly written and ambiguous39. General procedural guarantees 
safeguard that cases in judicial and administrative proceedings are decided within a rea-
sonable time (article 29 sec. 1 Swiss Constitution). A "bureaucratic" attitude of the ad-
ministration, especially the administration acting overly formalistic40, may be challenged 
under article 5 section 3 of the Swiss Constitution; state institutions (and private per-
sons) shall act in good faith. It is possible but by all means open to question whether a 
"new" fundamental right will intensify court control on legislative and administrative be-
havior. 
In sum, the popular initiatives may improve some aspects of implementation and en-
forcement. Other positive impacts on regulation and legislative process are however 
doubtful. 
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